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ABSTRACT
The formation of informal groupings of states is a manifestation of the 
global shift in economic power. One such a grouping is the BRICS, con-
sisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which stands out 
for its importance due to its economic weight, its coverage across con-
tinents and the numerous internal differences. The BRICS have collec-
tively flexed their muscle and expressed their intentions to extend their 
cooperation at the United Nations (UN). Proposals in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UN GA) take the form of resolutions, which can be 
written and co-written by the UN member states. This so-called spon-
soring of resolutions is a way to push agenda items forward. Using a 
large-N network analysis, we examine the patterns of co-sponsorship 
of the BRICS of resolutions adopted in the UN GA plenary sessions. We 
find that the BRICS cooperate on fields such as economic issues, how-
ever, they do not form a coherent bloc when it comes to resolution 
sponsorship. These results raise the question in what way the BRICS 
actually cooperate at the UN level.
Introduction
The formation of informal groupings of states is a manifestation of a major shift in interna-
tional relations. These groupings often focus on intergovernmental interaction, and include 
the G8 and G20.1 The grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) lacks 
geographical convergence, economic similarity and convergence in internal politics, which 
makes the so-called BRICS an unusual grouping.2 Nonetheless, scholars have noted that this 
group stands out for its importance, due to its economic weight and its span across conti-
nents.3 One of the goals of BRICS as a grouping has been to enhance their power on the 
international stage and collectively challenge the Western-led world order.4 In their joint 
statements, the BRICS express their intention to extend their cooperation within the United 
Nations (UN).5 In this way, BRICS cooperation would be in line with activities of other regional 
groupings, which externalise their internal concerns at the global stage.6
Given the expressed wish of the BRICS to cooperate on the UN level, and given that they 
already organise themselves as a network outside of the UN,7 we expect them to engage in 
closer cooperation on policy proposals following their institutionalisation. Whereas earlier 
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scholarship has looked at the voting patterns of BRICS at the UN,8 we use a different metric: 
we look at the co-sponsorship behaviour of BRICS countries in the United Nations General 
Assembly (UN GA). The study of co-sponsorship allows us to examine whether the BRICS use 
the UN GA to push forward agenda items that they would like to address. To this end, we 
analyse 633 resolutions which were proposed in the UN GA between 2000 and 2018. In 
particular, we are interested in finding out whether the institutionalisation of BRICS in 2011 
led to increased collaboration among the BRICS in the UN GA – in other words, whether the 
BRICS delivered on the expectation of increased cooperation at the UN. Increased co-spon-
sorship would magnify BRICS’ power in the international field, insofar as by sponsoring res-
olutions, they can push forward policy changes that are aligned with their own interests.
We focus on the UN GA because, as Voeten states, ‘[it] is the only forum in which a large 
number of states meet and vote on a regular basis on issues concerning the international 
community’.9 The study of the behaviour of states in the UN GA over an extended period of 
time has for a long time been considered to be one of the suitable options to study under-
lying preferences of states over a large number of issues.10
To analyse co-sponsorship, we turn to network analysis. The tools of network analysis for 
the study of co-sponsorship have been widely used in the recent political science scholarship 
as a way to analyse how actors cooperate in different settings. Network analysis has been 
used recently to study co-sponsorship patterns in the US Congress, in the amicus curiae 
letters to the US Supreme Court, or in state legislatures in the US.11 By examining different 
aspects of the network formed through their co-sponsorship activities, we are able to scru-
tinise the BRICS’ cooperation in the UN GA. We focus on the behaviour of the BRICS in the 
UN GA plenary sessions.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will review the scholarship on 
the cooperation in the UN GA, as well as the role of BRICS in the UN GA. In the following 
section, we will offer a brief methodological discussion about the use of network analysis 
for study of international cooperation. The fourth section will discuss the results of our anal-
ysis, and the fifth section concludes the paper.
BRICS and cooperation at the UN GA
Scrutinising the behaviour of the BRICS in the UN assumes that the BRICS cooperate on an 
international political level. This assumption is based on their efforts to coordinate policies 
which are reflected in their strategies and inter-ministerial processes.12 Heads of governments 
have been meeting since 2008, and from 2013 onwards the leaders also meet during G20 
summits.13 Moreover, they have been publishing joint statements and action plans. As argued 
by Laïdi,14 the impact of the BRICS can be assessed based on the degree of political coherence 
among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international system. Yet, the lack of 
obvious transformations has led to criticism of BRICS as diplomatically ineffective,15 due to 
their internal heterogeneity.16
Ever since the birth of the BRICS formation, the grouping’s voting cohesion at the UN GA 
has been studied extensively. Ferdinand17 analysed the voting cohesion of the BRICS in 
1974–2008 and found a greater and continuous tendency of the BRICS voting compared to 
the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) to vote in favour 
of UN GA resolutions. Voting cohesion among BRICS is higher than in the UN GA as a whole, 
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but a little lower compared to other developing countries. As Ferdinand argues, within the 
BRICS there has been a clear divergence between the greater cohesion of India, Brazil and 
South Africa and the somewhat lower cohesion of Russia and China. In contrast to these 
findings, Hooijmakers and Keukeleire18 suggest, that in general, there was no cohesive BRICS 
voting bloc in the UN GA in 2006–2014. Moreover, they also find that despite a number of 
BRICS’ statements in which the UN is mentioned, and in which the commitment to cooper-
ation is expressed, there has been no significant increase in voting cohesion between the 
BRICS since the start of the consultations in the BRICs framework in 2006.
These findings contrast to the work of scholars concerning the ‘rising powers’. While BRICS 
have not been able to bring about any revolutionary reordering of the international system,19 
strengthened by their newly gained economic weight, they have tried to challenge the status 
quo within the existing institutions and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).20 Even 
though these rising powers do not come close to challenging the US in its hegemony, it is 
clear that in their upswing, the BRICS have flexed their muscle to advocate for a more prom-
inent role in the current Western-led international order, and are likely to continue to do so. 
Several scholars have stated that the BRICS’ increase in economic power has been followed 
by a greater willingness, assertiveness and ability to exert influence, as they have already 
shown in multiple IGOs.21 This willingness is partially underlined by a shared view among 
the BRICS of the current world order as being unfair.22 Additionally, in his work on the BRICS, 
Mielniczuk23 explains how the interests of the BRICS states became more convergent over 
time, and how they increasingly focused on the same topics. The BRICS have expressed 
similar positions on topics such as non-intervention, respect for international law, restruc-
turing of the global order and developmental issues. However, one has to point out that this 
perceived shared outlook of the world may be limited by the numerous differences that 
exist between the BRICS states, for example, but not limited to, their internal governance 
structures, economic policies and views on human rights issues.24
Cooperation among the BRICS nations has increased considerably since the 2011 con-
solidation into their current formation. The BRICS have joined hands and participated in the 
international field following the current, Western-led global order.25 They have displayed 
cooperation in a number of IGOs in order to reach common objectives and push forward 
shared interests. As stressed by Abbott and Snidal, the role of IGOs is crucial: ‘Formal IGOs 
have played a major role in many, if not most, instances of interstate collaboration’.26 IGOs 
allow states to reach objectives that they would not have been able to reach without them. 
The UN GA is special in this regard, as it is considered the eminent platform to push forward 
foreign policy preferences, a place where ‘international politics is played out’27 and in which 
foreign policy preferences can be expressed.28
Such increased cooperation is to be expected, according to the realist scholars of inter-
national relations. According to the realist ‘balancing’ theory, cooperation between states 
happens when states face a common threat and pool their resources to defend themselves 
against this threat.29 Such theory provides the basis for the ‘counterhegemonic bloc hypoth-
esis’, presented by Voeten.30 Through this counterhegemonic bloc, rising powers can chal-
lenge the power of the hegemon, in this case the US. The formation of such a bloc might be 
seen as self-help behaviour of the states to ensure their own survival in the anarchic envi-
ronment in which they operate. By forming such a bloc, states challenge the existing rules 
and principles of the international system. Voeten31 finds that in 1991–1996, a counterhe-
gemonic voting bloc existed in the UN GA, of which, among others, China and India were 
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part. This proves that states, notwithstanding their internal differences, can form a coherent 
voting bloc to challenge the US hegemony.
Prior research has shown similar assertiveness of the BRICS in the UN SC, on which they 
all occupied a seat in 2011. As members of the UN SC, they showed coherent voting behaviour. 
The BRICS abstained from supporting a draft resolution on Syria and the following human 
rights violations.32 According to Armijo and Roberts33 these joint positions are a sign of 
conciliation and coordination between the different BRICS states, given that some of the 
positions seemed to not necessarily reflect self-interest. In their New Delhi Declaration pub-
lished in 2012, the BRICS look back on their shared year in the UN SC and state their intention 
to ‘underscore our commitment to work together in the UN … in the years to come’.34 
However, one year later, in 2012, when all BRICS except for Brazil were still serving on the 
UN SC, Russia and China vetoed resolutions for which India and South Africa voted in favour. 
A common denominator for the BRICS in the UN SC can be found in their shared disapproval 
of the use of force or sanctions.35 The BRICS’ efforts to reform the UN SC and to gain influence 
have been rather unsuccessful,36 partly due to the differences in power that exist between 
China and Russia as permanent members on the one hand, and the other BRICS states on 
the other hand.
Method
In the light of the current global order, it is interesting to have a new look at sponsorship 
behaviour within the UN GA and see whether the BRICS show sponsorship cohesion. 
Moreover, Ferdinand37 recommends further research into the diplomatic behaviour of the 
BRICS within the different bodies of the UN. With this research, we aim to further clarify the 
patterns of BRICS co-sponsorship activities and provide an explanation for this.
Why study resolution co-sponsorship?
The cooperation of states at the UN GA has been traditionally studied by examining voting 
and voting cohesion. One of the first academics to study the voting patterns has been Bruce 
Russet.38 The scholarship was further developed by Erik Voeten, who studied the transfor-
mations of voting alignments in the UN GA after the end of the Cold War.39 One of Voeten’s 
key take-away messages was that the East–West and North–South divides, present during 
the Cold War, remain present even after the end of the super-power competition. However, 
he also found an ‘emerging counterhegemonic voting bloc’40 composed of rising powers 
that challenge the US-led global order.41 Yet, as Hooijmakers and Keukeleire42 discuss, focus-
ing on voting behaviour shows only a tip of the iceberg – only the output of the ongoing 
processes at the UN GA.
The resolution co-sponsorship provides a new (and hitherto surprisingly not widely used) 
avenue for studying processes of cooperation. Early studies in this stream originate already 
in 1960 and focused on comparing East–West and North–South cooperation.43 Yet, these 
studies have not been followed by more recent analysis of co-sponsorship behaviour in the 
UN GA44 This is rather surprising given that the study of co-sponsorship flourished elsewhere, 
for example in the study of the US domestic political system.45 Scholars in this area use 
co-sponsorship patterns to reveal long-term coalitions, which are ‘often used to pursue 
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strategic goals at reduced costs, shape public debate by influencing a broader platform, 
gather information, and receive symbolic benefits’.46
To empirically analyse co-sponsorship, we turn to the tools of network analysis, and map 
patterns of co-sponsorship as a network. We conceptualise UN member states as nodes, and 
any joint co-sponsorship as an undirected tie between them. Network analysis allows us to 
examine the behaviour and interactions of the BRICS and relate them to the larger network 
of the UN GA. This allows us not only to see how much the BRICS co-sponsor with one 
another, but also how their co-sponsorship activity relates to the UN GA as a whole. In this 
way, we are able to identify the roles the BRICS states play within their grouping, be it central 
players or less-connected outsiders. We combine the network topology and statistics pro-
vided by network analysis with a qualitative assessment of the sponsorship behaviour of 
the BRICS grouping. Qualitative assessment is required to provide more information on the 
type of resolutions that are co-sponsored by the BRICS. This includes the topics discussed 
in the resolutions, as well as possible other co-sponsors of the specific resolutions. The latter 
is important to distinguish coordinated efforts of the BRICS as a grouping from coincidental 
cooperation on resolutions sponsored by a large number of states.
Data
We look at BRICS co-sponsorship in the period 2000–2018, but split this period into two 
parts: 2000–2010 and 2011–2018. The year 2011 was chosen as a cut-off point, because that 
was when South Africa joined BRICS and the grouping found its current shape. We analyse 
all draft resolutions discussed by the UN GA in this period.47 We removed resolutions sub-
mitted by the President of the UN GA, as well as resolutions sponsored by a single country 
from our sample. Thus, we are left with 633 resolutions.
We also assigned each resolution a code based on the topic it addresses: Middle East, 
disarmament, nuclear disarmament, human rights, colonialism and economic issues, adopt-
ing Voeten’s coding.48 Voeten’s coding is exhaustive, but fails to address one theme – internal 
matters of the UN, related to the structure, tasks and role of the UN. We thus coded these as 
‘internal matters’ resolutions.
Metrics
We assess the following four characteristics of the BRICS network in the UN GA sponsorship 
activities.
Network density
The network density of the BRICS is relevant as it compares the number of connections, i.e. 
the number of resolutions the different BRICS states co-sponsor together with the potential 
number of connections. A complete network has a value of 1, meaning that it contains all 
possible edges. We compare the density of the BRICS’ network as cooperation on resolutions 
in the UN GA in the years after their development as a common group with the years before. 
An increased density of their networks would imply enhanced cooperation in the UN GA. 
Comparing the network density of the BRICS’ network to the overall UN GA allows us to put 
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the development of the network density of the BRICS into perspective regarding overall 
developments in the UN GA.
Weighted degree centrality
Weighted degree centrality assigns an importance score based purely on the number of 
ties held by each node and the weight of these ties. It reveals how many direct connections 
each agent has within the network. Hafner-Burton et al. describe the strength of a tie as 
dependent on both the magnitude and the frequency of interactions between two nodes.49 
We calculate the weight of a tie based on the number of resolutions the different nodes 
(states) have co-sponsored together. A higher degree of centrality may either be explained 
by a higher number of ties or by ties that are relatively stronger compared to the ties of 
other actors. In other words, an increase in the weighted degree centrality can be explained 
by an increase in the number of ties a node ‘possesses’ or an increase in the strength of 
existing ties.
To gain a more complete picture, we also retrieve the network density and the weighted 
degree centrality for the whole UN GA, and compare it with the development of the weighted 
degree centrality of the BRICS countries.
Communities
An essential part of network analysis is the identification of different groupings within a 
network. Communities consist of states that show aligned sponsorship activities; states that 
co-sponsor the same resolutions often and that show above-average levels of cooperation. 
We identify communities through the modularity statistic, which looks for the nodes that 
are more densely connected with one another than with the rest of the network.50
Weight of ties
Besides characteristics of the nodes within the network, one can also identify certain char-
acteristics of the network’s ties. The more resolutions two states co-sponsored, the higher 
the weight of the tie.
Results
As discussed earlier, we look at the UN GA in 2000–2018, split into 2000–2010 and 2011–2018. 
In this section, the results of the network analysis are discussed and enriched with a quali-
tative assessment of the cooperation patterns of the BRICS.
UN GA plenary
Table 1 presents the network statistics of co-sponsorship patterns in the UN GA plenary. We 
see in this data that co-sponsorship patterns vary over time, but also across issues. Before 
starting, however, we should note that there is no resolution in either of the periods that 
would be sponsored exclusively by the BRICS countries as a group.
Starting with the Middle East, we notice a decrease in network density in the two periods, 
which suggests that countries’ cooperation on this issue decreases over time. The drop in the 
average weighted degree suggests the same – connections in the network in the post-2011 
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period are less strong. The pattern is similar among the BRICS countries – whereas in the pre-
2011 period the network density of the BRICS network is comparatively high (0.8), it drops 
substantially after the institutionalisation of BRICS, namely to a fourth of the original value. 
The average weighted degree declines similarly. This suggests that despite the BRICS efforts 
to act as an actor in the Middle East,51 their mutual actorhood on the global level in the UN 
actually decreased during this period.
Figure 1 demonstrates the same effect. We can see that only Russia co-sponsored resolu-
tions with China and India (separately). Different colours of the individual nodes suggest 
that in the whole sample of the UN GA, the BRICS countries belong to completely different 
camps, when it comes to the issues related to the Middle East. This is a marked change from 
the pre-2011 period, when four out of five BRICS countries (all but South Africa) belonged 
to the same camp. We may also remark that the thickness of the ties between nodes decreases, 
suggesting that the BRICS countries co-sponsor fewer resolutions among themselves.
Moving on to disarmament, we notice a similar pattern of a decrease in the density of 
the overall network although, comparatively speaking, on the issues of disarmament, the 
co-sponsorship density is one of the highest. Among the BRICS countries, we remark that 
there is no change in the network density – in both periods, all BRICS countries co-sponsor 
at least one resolution with one another. Figure 1 shows that the pattern of cooperation is 
very similar over time, and especially Russia and China appear to be central nodes in this 
network. However, we see that Brazil belongs to a different community than other BRICS 
countries, and closer analysis of Brazil’s co-sponsorship reveals that it tends to co-sponsor 
resolutions on disarmament mainly with European powers, such as France, Germany, 
Netherlands or Denmark. A closer look also shows changes over time. For example, Brazil 
has the strongest tie (sponsors the highest number of resolutions) with South Africa (of all 
BRICS countries), but changes pattern: whereas in the period 2000–2010, the two countries 
cooperated on resolutions on ‘zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic’, they do 
not do so in 2011–2018, even though resolutions on this topic continue to be submitted. 
Resolutions co-sponsored by all BRICS, such as the one on ‘building a peaceful and better 
world through the Olympic ideal’ or ‘the declaration and program of action of a culture of 
peace’, tend to be the ones attracting very large numbers of sponsors. We therefore do not 
observe any BRICS-specific activity or sponsorship of any new ‘BRICS-only’ resolutions.
Before discussing the co-sponsorship of issues related to colonialism, it is worth men-
tioning that the issue of colonialism is one of the smaller themes, and there are comparatively 
fewer resolutions dealing with it. On colonialism, the overall density of the UN GA network 
decreases, as does the density of the BRICS network. Looking at the BRICS community in 
Table 1. uN Ga Network statistics.
Number of resolutions Network density Weighted degree centrality
2000–2010 2011–2018 2000–2010 2011–2018 2000–2010 2011–2018
uN Ga BriCS uN Ga BriCS uN Ga BriCS uN Ga BriCS
Middle east 82 35 0.719 0.8 0.539 0.2 459.6 8.4 324.7 1.2
disarmament 82 55 0.918 1 0.749 1 640.5 25.2 441.5 22.8
Colonialism 7 6 0.913 1 0.775 0.6 145.6 4.8 67.1 5.6
economic issues 44 20 0.385 0.5 0.548 0.9 135.9 3.2 112.2 8.8
human rights 92 53 0.88 1 0.629 1 452.7 4 414.9 12.4
development 169 97 0.929 1 0.761 1 1619.5 64.4 645.2 28.8
internal uN matters 34 27 0.592 1 0.476 0.4 291.3 22.4 123.8 2.8
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Figure 1. BriCS co-sponsorship networks.
Figure 1, we observe that in the period 2000–2010, Brazil was not a member of the same 
community. However, in the period of 2011–2018, it is South Africa and Russia that are not 
members of the same community. Looking at the resolutions sponsored, in the first period, 
all BRICS sponsored a resolution related to ‘the commemoration of the two-hundredth anni-
versary of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade’; whereas in the second period, the 
BRICS states sponsored a resolution on ‘the permanent memorial to and remembrance of 
the victims of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade’.
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Figure 1. (Continued)
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Economic issues are also one of the smaller themes, but we see that this is the only theme 
where the co-sponsorship density increases over time within the whole UN GA, as well as 
among the BRICS. At the same time, we notice the decrease in the weighted degree centrality, 
which suggests that while more countries are connected (demonstrated by increasing den-
sity), the connections are weaker (i.e. they co-sponsor fewer resolutions). Looking at Figure 1, 
we see that not only are BRICS co-sponsoring more, they are also co-sponsoring more together. 
In the first period, the five BRICS states are divided into two communities; India, China and 
South Africa are part of one community and Brazil and Russia of another. In 2011–2018, all 
BRICS except for South Africa were part of the same community in the UN GA. This shows that 
the four original BRIC states showed above average levels of cooperation, whereas South 
Africa co-sponsored more often with some European states and Australia, when it comes to 
the economic issues. In the first period, Brazil is the most central actor of the BRICS in the 
network of the UN GA, whereas in the second period of analysis, China and Brazil are the most 
central actors. This pattern fits in line with the argumentation that BRICS are primarily inter-
ested in enhancing their economic cooperation, as argued by Narlikar.52
As for the human rights, the density of the network of the UN GA has decreased over 
time. For the BRICS, in both periods the density of the network equals 1, which means that 
all BRICS countries are connected to one another. However, we notice an increase in the 
weighted degree centrality, which means that the BRICS countries co-sponsor more resolu-
tions with one another (despite an overall decline in the number of submitted resolutions). 
Figure 1 confirms this pattern. We see that BRICS countries belong to two different camps, 
and this division persists over time: China and South Africa belong consistently to a different 
group to Brazil, India and Russia. This grouping is intriguing, since it does not split the BRICS 
among the lines of the adherence to democracy. For example, China and South Africa spon-
sored a resolution on ‘international cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of 
natural disasters, from relief to development’ and ‘sanitation for all’; while Brazil, Russia and 
India cooperated on a resolution on ‘permanent memorial to and remembrance of the victims 
of slavery and transatlantic slave trade’. We see that the weakest is the connection between 
Brazil and China, completely reverse from the theme of economic issues, where the connec-
tion between these two countries is the strongest.
When it comes to the issue of development, we see a decline in the overall density of 
cooperation, from very high levels. Similarly, the weighted degree centrality drops signifi-
cantly, suggesting that not only fewer states cooperate (as demonstrated by decreasing 
network density), but also that they cooperate less. The BRICS, however, have a network 
density of one in both periods under study. We also see a decline in the weighted degree 
centrality, which suggests less co-sponsorship overall, but still in line with the rest of the UN 
GA. Figure 1 again shows that BRICS countries belong to three different communities in each 
of the periods. In 2000–2010, Brazil and Russia showed cooperation with mostly European 
states; South Africa’s preferred partners in this field are mainly developed Western European 
economies; India and China showed higher levels of cooperation with mostly Asian states. 
In 2011–2018, India cooperated mostly with European and East Asian states, Brazil and South 
Africa with European countries, while Russia and China co-sponsored mainly with other 
Asian states. This change shows a new and unexpected reordering of collaboration within 
the UN GA on international developments. We may also remark that the ties between nodes 
are weaker after 2011, suggesting fewer co-sponsored resolutions. In both periods, BRICS 
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all co-sponsored a resolution to ‘build a peaceful and better world through sport and the 
Olympic ideal’, but this was more broadly co-sponsored.
Last but not least, on the internal UN matters, the overall density of the network decreases, 
and so does the weighted degree centrality. We observe similar patterns among the BRICS. 
Whereas in the first period, all BRICS co-sponsored with one another, the network density 
decreases to 0.4 in the post-2011 period. In the post-2011 period, Russia did not co-sponsor 
any resolution on this topic with any other BRICS country. However, we see that in the post-
2011, the other BRICS countries belong to the same community of countries.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we examined the cooperation of the BRICS countries in the UN GA through 
the network analysis of co-sponsorship patterns within the UN GA. We were in particular 
interested in finding out whether the institutionalisation of cooperation within BRICS has 
led to higher actorhood of BRICS on the global scale. We see that, overall, there are no signs 
of enhanced cooperation among the BRICS in the UN GA. The only exception to this rule is 
the cooperation on economic themes, where the cooperation is somewhat increased 
over time.
Ever since the BRICS grouping was completed in 2011, the BRICS have published joint 
statements on their cooperation and their intentions on future cooperation, both outside 
as well as within the UN framework. Since then, the BRICS leaders have met annually along-
side the UN GA sessions, after which they publish declarations on their positions regarding 
foreign policy issues, which have become increasingly more detailed throughout the years.53 
In 2012 the BRICS published their New Delhi Declaration, in which they stress their commit-
ment to continuing cooperation with the UN.54 They continued to do so in later declarations, 
for example the Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan in 2014.55
One would expect this cooperation to result in concrete action within the UN structures, 
for example through coordinated and aligned voting behaviour or the co-sponsorship of 
resolutions. The voting behaviour of the BRICS has been studied by Ferdinand56 and 
Hooijmakers and Keukeleire,57 who find opposing outcomes on the voting coherence of the 
BRICS. Our study finds that although the BRICS show enhanced cooperation in some fields 
since the start of the BRICS cooperation, a clear and joint strategy among the BRICS is lacking. 
Using the tool of social network analysis, hitherto unused in the study of the role of the BRICS 
on the global scene, we demonstrate that BRICS role in the UN GA remains very limited. The 
BRICS fail to form one coherent bloc, which is for example illustrated by the fact that in all 
of the years analysed in this study, the BRICS never sponsored a single resolution as a group-
ing (as the EU or Scandinavian countries usually do).
Additionally, in all of the themes evaluated, the BRICS are part of different communities 
in the UN GA, which proves that their co-sponsorship behaviour is not strongly aligned, and 
they continue to co-sponsor resolutions with different countries as partners. There is evi-
dence of ongoing cooperation, the statements from the summits, and undeniable attempts 
to cooperate more,58 yet barely any of this is reflected at the UN GA. Our results also partially 
confirm the findings of Laïdi’s earlier work, assessing the impact of the BRICS on the degree 
of political coherence among them.59 We concur with Laïdi’s findings that BRICS countries 
are heterogenous, and that they do not offer any single counter-hegemonic alternative. If 
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co-sponsorship behaviour is understood as a sign of political coherence, we conclude that 
their political coherence in the UN GA is rather low.60 On the other hand, our results contrast 
with the findings of Ferdinand, who found a great cohesion on the basis of voting similarity 
between Brazil, India and South Africa in comparison to that between Russia and China.61 
This contrasts with findings in our research which show that China, India and Brazil are often 
better connected than South Africa and Russia. This finding also underscores the need for 
multi-method research, and the use of different tools to analyse how active BRICS countries 
are at the UN. It may be exactly the lack of coherence in co-sponsorship which may explain 
Pant’s finding that the BRICS have not been diplomatically effective in their diplomatic activ-
ities. 62
In line with existing literature, we find no signs that the BRICS would use the UN GA as a 
platform for revolutionary change in international order. Contrary to Stuenkel’s expecta-
tions,63 the BRICS do not seem to challenge the current world order within international 
institutions and IGOs, at least not through the UN GA as its main deliberative body. 
Institutionalisation of BRICS did not lead to heightened cooperation at the UN GA. We 
observe no strengthening of cooperation within BRICS after 2011, and we also observe that 
there is no increase in coherence among the BRICS countries. They continue to belong to 
different groups on all of the issues under study. While there is a certain regrouping in terms 
of which communities BRICS belong to, they never become members of the same commu-
nity. Our method, the use of social network analysis, allows us to identify exactly which 
communities BRICS countries belong to, something not done in the prior literature.
Applying a mixed-methods approach allowed us to empirically analyse the BRICS’ 
behaviour, and added value to the outcomes through a qualitative assessment. We examined 
the density and weighted degree centrality of the BRICS network, as well as the communities 
of which the BRICS states are a part. Our results suggest that the BRICS have not been able 
to develop a group position on the topics discussed, which has led to a lack of collective 
action.64 By using this novel method, and classifying the resolutions by theme, our paper 
was able to analyse BRICS cooperation across multiple areas. We can therefore detect differ-
ences across different areas. Policy areas addressed in this study include the Middle East, 
disarmament, colonialism, economic issues, human rights, development and internal UN 
matters – of which it appears that the BRICS have been able to arrive at consensus only on 
economic issues.
Our analysis demonstrates that the institutionalisation of BRICS does not lead to increased 
cooperation on the typical, hard security themes such as disarmament, the Middle East or 
colonialism. Furthermore, we demonstrate that BRICS countries certainly do not only coop-
erate on resolutions if this resolution enhances their individual position in the global order. 
The counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis that Voeten presents in his work65 does not seem 
to apply for the co-sponsorship activities of the BRICS, as the BRICS do not form one coherent 
bloc. Our findings underline the heterogeneity among the BRICS scholars mentioned in 
earlier work,66 and show that the BRICS are not yet as effective as some of the regional 
organisations active in the UN GA.67
If we are to analyse BRICS within the framework of regional organisations, the findings 
might not be too surprising. The relative lack of activity of BRICS at the UN GA may stem 
from the group’s small size and young age. As Panke et al. argue, especially larger and older 
regional organisations are active at the level of international organisations.68 Although a 
different paper by Panke et al.69 focused on the particular instance of UN GA and found that 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 13
smaller sized organisations tend to favour regional organisations’ activity, BRICS seems to 
be impeded by a lack of shared resources (the grouping is poorly equipped), young age and 
a mismatch in policy preferences. In a way, the old finding by Haas and Rowe70 still rings 
true: the emergence of regional cooperation does not automatically translate into external-
isation at the supranational level. Although Kim and Russet remind us71 that the UN is not 
entirely suited for studying international politics and power relationships in the real world 
due to the ‘one nation–one vote’ principle, our paper opens future avenues for research at 
every turn. Future work should complement this quantitative design with more qualitative 
analysis, looking more in-depth at cooperation at the national level. Similarly, a study of 
other groupings could be undertaken to find more generalisable findings about the trans-
formation of co-sponsorship patterns at the UN. Finally, future scholars might find it fruitful 
to study the behaviour of the BRICS in other IGOs.
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